We analyze installment borrowing decisions from two random samples of customers of a credit card company before and after the 2003 credit crisis in Korea. In an attempt to increase its market share, the company more or less randomly offers its customers free installments, i.e. opportunities to pay off card purchases in up to twelve monthly installments at a zero interest rate. We exploit these offers as a quasi-random field experiment to better understand consumer demand for credit. Despite censoring in the data (we observe free installment offers only when customers choose them), our econometric model is able to separately identify the probability a customer is offered a free installment opportunity from the probability they take it. We find that the company sharply reduced free installment offers after the crisis, while customer take-up rates increased from an average of 13% before the crisis to 20% after it. Among the minority of customers who take the interest-free loan offers, most precommit to repay the loan over a term that is shorter than the maximum allowed under the offer. This behavior is puzzling given that there are no pre-payment penalties and these offers can be easily accepted at the push of a button at the check out counter. Rational expected utility maximizers should take every interest-free loan offer for the maximum allowed term if the transaction cost of taking the offer is zero. A possible explanation of this behavior is that customers, in an exercise of financial self-control, resist the temptation of interest-free loan offers to avoid becoming excessively indebted.
Introduction
It is well documented that poorly regulated financial markets can be inherently unstable, with recurrent cycles of booms, panics, and busts (see, e.g. Kindleberger [1978] , Smith et al. [1988] , Reinhart and Rogoff [2009] , Mendoza and Terrones [2012] , and Shiller [2015] ). What is less clear is whether this instability is caused by "irrationality" of market participants as Shiller [2015] argues, or reflects the build up and bursting of "rational bubbles" that are among the multiplicity of equilibria possible in dynamic asset markets (see, e.g. Tirole [1985] ). Regardless of the cause, it is hard to escape the conclusion that many financial markets experience periodic collective losses of financial self-control. In credit markets, the booms resemble a lemming-like rush to lend to increasingly less credit-worthy borrowers until leverage far exceeds historical norms. When the lemmings reach the precipice a financial panic occurs, and the boom quickly turns into a bust with wave of defaults and contractions due to tight credit while de-leveraging occurs. card lending, whereas the crisis in the U.S. was due to excessive mortgage lending. Also, unlike the U.S., the Korean central bank moved quickly to calm the panic and rescue a major lender, LG Card, so the real macroeconomic impact of the Korean crisis was comparatively minor. Otherwise the basic pattern of the Korean crisis is typical: "intensified competition in the high-yield, less prime, credit card lending business leading to reduced lending standards; a rapid build-up in household indebtedness; a disproportionate concentration of debt burdens among riskier cardholders; a sudden deterioration of asset quality; and a subsequent contraction in credit card receivables." (Kang and Ma [2007] , p. 55).
At the peak of the credit card boom in 2002, the typical Korean had more than 3 credit cards with balances in excess of $2000, and aggregate credit card debt amounted to nearly 15% of GDP. In contrast, in the bust period after the 2003 panic, credit card debt rapidly fell to less than $700 per capita and 5% of GDP. However in the process of de-leveraging, "Many leading issuers suffered heavy losses from their card lending business. It is estimated that about one third of the entire card lending book at its peak eventually had to be written off." (Kang and Ma [2009], p. 103) . While the broad outlines of financial crises have been well documented at the macro level, much less is known about what happens at the micro level. How 1 does the behavior of individual lenders and borrowers change between the boom and bust periods on either side of a financial crisis? Who is most at fault for the crisis: the lenders who make unwise loans, or the customers who voluntarily take on too much debt?
This paper presents new findings on the supply and demand for credit based on a unique new data set that allows us to observe "micro-borrowing" decisions made by a sample of customers of a major Korean credit card company. The company (which has requested to remain anonymous) provided us with random samples of their customers before and after the 2003 crisis that enables us to analyze how it affected lending, spending, and borrowing behavior. While these shifts are consistent with the changes Kang and Ma documented using lower frequency macro data, our micro data enables us to analyze behavior that would be difficult to identify using macro data alone. In particular, contrary to the standard narrative that credit crises are caused by excessive borrowing by consumers, the customers in our samples appear to have exercised, if anything, excessive financial self-control -both before and after the crisis. Specifically, we find that customers in our samples had a surprisingly low propensity to take interest-free loan offers, and take up rates were significantly lower before the 2003 crisis than after it.
Unlike revolving credit provided by most U.S.-based credit cards, the main type of credit offered by the company we study is installment credit, a contract that is commonly used by credit card companies in Latin America and Asia. Installment credit contracts require customers to make an ex ante choice of the number of installments over which to pay back the amount of each purchase they make with their credit card. Our data allow us to observe hundreds of thousands of these micro-borrowing decisions on a transaction by transaction basis. Each monthly billing statement reminds the customer of the interest rate schedule applicable for installment loans payable over 2 to 12 billing statements (months). 1 In an attempt to increase its market share, the company more or less randomly offers its customers free installments, i.e. pre-approved installment loans at a zero interest rate for durations up to twelve months.
We exploit these free installment offers as a quasi-random experiment to help identify the demand for credit using a flexible "behavioral" discrete choice model of installment credit decisions that accounts for censoring (choice based sampling of free installments). Despite the fact that we only observe free installment offers when consumers choose them, we show that it is possible to separately identify consumers' 1 In contrast, revolving credit contracts are similar to a line of credit that gives a customer the freedom to choose how quickly to pay off their past purchase balances. Revolving credit is a relatively new product for this company, offered only to a minority of its customers with the best credit scores. Customers who do not have revolving credit privileges must pay the full balance due at each statement date. The essential difference between installment and revolving credit is that installment loans are for fixed terms that must be chosen by the customer, ex ante at the time of each purchase.
2 choice probabilities and the probability they are offered free installments. In particular, we can identify the probability that consumers will decline free installment offers, and the probability they will accept them but precommit to repay the loan in fewer installments than the maximum number allowed under the offer.
The average interest rate the company charges its customers for positive interest installment loans is approximately 15%, so we would expect that free installment offers would have a high take-up rate. However we show that the take-up rate for these offers is actually very low: fewer than 3% of the transactions in our post-crisis sample were made as free installments, even though we estimate that customers are offered free installments in approximately 15% of all transactions they made with this credit card. This implies an average take-up rate of only 20%. In the pre-crisis sample, 7.8% of all transactions were interest-free installments. However we estimate that customers were offered free installments in nearly 60% of all transactions before the crisis, so the take-up rate of these offers was actually lower, approximately 13%.
This suggests that the company was pushing its customers to take on more credit card debt before the 2003 crisis, but customers exercised financial self-control by resisting these offers. After the crisis, the company dramatically reduced the number of interest-free loan offers to its customers, and it significantly raised its interest rates on positive-interest rate loans. This may explain why the customers in the post-crisis sample were more likely to take interest-free loan offers than those in the pre-crisis sample.
Our model also predicts that customers will sometimes choose a positive interest installment loan instead of an interest-free offer of shorter maximum duration, and it predicts significant "suboptimal" precommitment behavior among the subset of individuals who do decide to take free installment offers.
For example, in the post-crisis sample, our model predicts that over 80% of the customers who were offered a free installment loan offer with a 10 month maximum duration precommitted themselves to pay off the loan in fewer than 10 installments. In the pre-crisis sample, the model predicts that nearly 88% of customers precommitted to paying off these loans faster than necessary.
Since free installment offers are pre-approved, entail negligible transaction costs, and have no prepayment penalties, the frequent selection of "dominated alternatives" is difficult to explain using standard expected utility models: rational consumers should always choose to borrow for the maximum allowed term when the interest rate is 0%. However theories of time inconsistent decision making and decision making by individuals with self-control problems can explain this behavior. One interpretation for our findings is that turning down an interest-free loan is not irrational, but rather an act of financial self-control.
Customers resist the temptation of interest-free loan offers to avoid becoming overly indebted.
3
Though there is well established and influential theoretical literature on time inconsistency and selfcontrol problems, (e.g. Strotz [1955] , Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] , Fudenberg and Levine [2006] , and Laibson [1997] ) there is not a great deal of empirical evidence supporting the predictions of these theories.
As Bernheim et al. [2012] note "Over the last twenty years, the concept of time inconsistency has emerged as a central theme in behavioral economics. As is well-known, any consumer sufficiently self-aware to notice her time-inconsistent tendencies will manifest a demand for precommitment technologies. At a minimum, consumers should acquire such self-awareness with respect to frequently repeated activities for which they consistently fail to follow through on prior intentions. Yet oddly, there is surprisingly little evidence that people actually value and exploit precommitment opportunities." (p. 1).
The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence that the customers in our sample do exploit precommitment opportunities. They do this by turning down free installment offers or by taking them and precommiting to pay the amount due faster than necessary. Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] explain how these sorts of precommitments, which appear irrational from the context of standard dynamic decision theory, can make individuals who face repeated temptations "unambiguously better off" (p. 1406).
However existing theories of time inconsistency or self-control problems may not be the only way to explain this behavior. There could be stigma associated with the decision to take a free installment offer, or consumers may believe that taking these offers could hurt their credit rating. While these latter explanations can explain low take-up rates, it is not clear that they can explain why customers precommit to repay interest-free loans faster than necessary, or why take-up of free installments increased after the crisis, when presumably any stigma (or concerns about harm to their credit scores) associated with taking free installment offers would have been higher than in the boom period before the crisis.
Though we show that taking free installments does not worsen a customer's credit score, we cannot rule out the possibility that some customers believe that this is the case. So the behavior we observe might also be explained by an expected utility model, but one where consumers have irrational beliefs.
On the other hand, in an era of rampant financial fraud, it may not be irrational to suspect that there is some hidden "catch" in an interest-free loan offer. For example late payment penalties could wipe out any interest savings on the amount borrowed. However credit card payments are done automatically and electronically, so there is no risk of late payments provided the customer's checking account balance is not overdrawn. Also the company we study is a large, reputable company, so it is far from a "fly by night" operation that would lead its customers to distrust its interest-free offers. 4 Lusardi and Mitchell [2014] summarize evidence of "financial illiteracy" that might also explain customers' failure to take interest-free offers as a result of sheer ignorance. For example they note that "that the least financially savvy incurred high transaction costs, paying higher fees and using high-cost borrowing." (p. 23). They survey other studies that show "that the less financially literate were substantially more likely to use high-cost methods of borrowing, a finding that is particularly strong among young adults (age 25 to 34)" and "many borrowers do not know what interest rates were charged on their credit card or mortgage balances" (p. 23).
Thus, there may be multiple ways to explain why customers in our samples pass up interest-free loan offers so frequently. Unfortunately our data are not rich enough to enable us to distinguish between these various possible explanations of the anomalous behavior we find. Even though we cannot identify the ultimate explanation for this behavior (and different explanations could apply to different people), the main contribution of this paper is simply to show this behavior exists and to use it to improve our understanding of the causes and consequences of the 2003 Korean financial crisis. To the extent that the financial crisis as a whole represents a temporary loss of "financial self-control" our results suggest the it was the credit card company, not its customers, that experienced the loss of self-control. The company "binged" on high rates of free installment offers before the crisis, but dramatically cut back on these offers after the crisis.
Section 2 describes our credit card data and shows that merchant fees make up a large share of company profits. We believe merchant fees and network externalities in credit card competition motivate the use of free installments: companies incentivize customers spending and borrowing to increase their own market share and profits. Section 4 introduces a flexible behavioral model of installment choice that forms the basis of our empirical analysis of customers' choice of payment term that accounts for the censored, choice-based nature of our data sets. We show that the estimated model fits the data extremely well, and the borrowing behavior it predicts reflects a great deal of consumer-specific heterogeneity, but generally very inelastic demand for installment credit. Most importantly, the model predicts the low take-up rate for free installment loan offers, and the high incidence of ex ante precommitment to loan terms that are shorter than the maximum term allowed under the loan offer. We test and strongly reject strong and weak dominance restrictions that constitute a priori restrictions on the behavioral model that rule out the anomalous precommitment behavior. Section 5 presents our conclusions and the insights our analysis provides into the question of whether excessive lending by credit card companies or excessive borrowing by credit card customers are most responsible for the credit boom and subsequent bust in Korea. to 2007. Both samples were drawn as "stock samples" i.e. random samples of the company's customers before and after the crisis, which is generally acknowledged to have come to a head shortly after the unexpected failure of SK Global in March 2003. Company executives told us that there were no major changes in the eligibility criteria to obtain a credit card before or after 2003. Thus, we are confident that any differences in spending or borrowing behavior we observe in these two samples are due to a change in behavior rather than systematic differences in the types of customers in our two samples. Table 1 summarizes the transaction numbers and volumes (in dollars) in the two samples. In terms of number of transactions, the most common transaction is a "sale" -i.e. the usual type of credit card transaction where the customer buys an item or a service from a merchant and is expected to repay the amount in full at the next statement date to which the transaction is assigned. The credit card company collects the balance due on the statement date automatically via a direct electronic debit from the customer's bank account. Sales transactions are the default type of credit provided by the credit card company and involve "free float" -the mean time from transaction to repayment (with no interest charges) is an average of 37 and 32 days in the pre-and post-crisis samples, respectively.
Besides ordinary sales transactions, the company extends longer term loans to its customers via three other transaction types: 1) installments, 2) cash advances, and 3) revolving purchases. Revolving purchases are the default type of transaction in the U.S. and most European countries, and provide customers wide discretion on how and when to pay these balances. Revolving accounts are a relatively new product in Korea, and we can see from table 1 they constitute only a small fraction of the credit extended by the company, both in terms of share of transactions, and the share of the total funds it lends. The main sources of credit the company provides are cash advances and installment loans. We can see from table 1 that cash advances constituted the largest share of funds the company loaned to its customers, both before and after the crisis. However after the crisis the share of cash advances dramatically contracted, from 71% before the crisis to 45% afterwards. The share of lending done via installment loans increased after the 6 We calculated the realized internal rates of return on 30614 installment transactions in our pre-crisis sample and 9658 transactions in the post-crisis sample. In the pre-crisis sample, two thirds of the transactions had a zero interest rate, whereas in the post-crisis sample, only 48% of the installments carried a zero interest rate. These zero interest or "free installments" are usually a result of special promotions that are provided either at the level of individual merchants (via agreement with the credit card company to help promote sales at particular merchants), or via general offers that the credit card company offers to all customers during specific periods of time either to encourage more spending, increased customer loyalty, or as a promotion to attract new customers. Though the company does not publish its schedule for setting interest rates, we were able to uncover (econometrically) the formula the company uses for setting installment credit interest rates by regression, and the high R 2 value, 0.99, indicates that we were successful in uncovering the formula the company uses to set interest rates for its customers. Interest rates not only depend on the credit score of the customer, but also on the duration of the installment loan. The credit card company uses a particular non-linear increasing interest premium schedule for loans over two months in duration that is common to all its customers, but with a base rate or intercept that varies with customer characteristics, particularly the customer's credit score. For example, the interest rate premium the company charges customers for a 12 month installment loan is 7 percentage points and, interestingly, this differential is the same for all customers.
Let r t (d, x) denote the installment interest rate schedule offered on calendar day t to a customer with characteristics x who desires to finance an installment purchase with d installments. Our regression analysis revealed that this schedule has the form
where the effects of time-varying macroeconomic and market conditions are captured by the time effect t and the characteristics of the particular consumer x only enter via the intercept term r 0 (x,t). The term r 1 (d,t) represents the interest premium for installments longer than d = 2 months. Our regression results reveals that this term does not depend on x but only d and t. Figure 1 graphs the interest premium customers must pay for various installment terms d > 2.
While the premium for longer duration installment loans is approximately the same for all customers, it does shift over time. Figure 1 shows that the company significantly raised this premium after the 2003 9 Korean credit crisis. The higher interest rates for installment loans may be one of the factors that caused the significant reduction in installment balances and installment loan usage that we document in figure   4 below. Note that one of the individual-specific factors that we did not include in the x vector is the customer's installment balance, or other measures of usage of installment loans. These variables are not statistically significant predictors of the interest rate charged to consumers after we include other customer characteristics, particularly the credit score and number of late payments.
However as we discussed in the introduction, there is a possibility that customers could be reluctant to take installments (both free installments and installments at a positive interest rate) out of a belief that a high installment balance would compromise their credit score. Company management assured us that the company does not penalize customers for installment borrowing by degrading their credit score. Indeed when we regress the company's 12 point integer-valued credit score on a variety of customer-specific characteristics x including the various measures of installment usage such as the change in installment balances, it does emerge as a significant predictor of credit scores, and in the expected direction -an increase in installment balances predict worse (higher) credit scores. However this finding is not robust to the inclusion of other customer-specific covariates such as the number of late payments. This suggests that the positive correlation between changes in installment balances and credit scores reflects spurious causality and omitted variable bias due to information that we do not observe that the company uses to set credit scores that is correlated with installment balances. We ran fixed-effect regressions to try to get further evidence as to the effect of installment spending on credit scores, and found no significant effect of changes in installment balances on changes in credit score. This confirms the company's claim that usage of installments per se does not cause them to degrade a customer's credit score. The most important predictor of credit scores is the number of late payments, and measures of how large and how late these balances are.
Interest-free Installment Loans
We already noted in the introduction that the credit card company uses interest-free loans as a marketing device to attract new customers and to incentivize its current customers to stay with the firm and to spend more using its credit card instead of using credit cards of its competitors. This company is very profitable and merchant fees associated with credit usage contribute in an important way to the overall profitability of the firm. Specifically, for our pre-crisis sample we found that merchant fees amounted to 36% of the total revenues received from these customers. In the pre-crisis sample, 22% of total revenues were from merchant fees, whereas customer finance charges constituted the largest share, 68%. Due to the structure of electronic payments in Korea, success in the credit card market depends on having a dominant market share. A combination of increasing returns to scale and network externalities cause the cards offered by the dominant firms to be accepted by more merchants and this in turn enables them to charge higher merchant fees. The company views interest-free installment loan offers as a critical part of its strategy to increase its market share and be successful in this market.
The company does not keep a record of when, where, and to whom interest-free installment offers were made. Instead, we can only learn about them indirectly via customers who chose them, since the company obviously does record the choices its customers make in order to bill them. Although they keep no central records, company management told us that it was their impression that after the crisis customers were offered free installments in 10 to 20% of all transactions they made with the company's credit card, and most of these offers had a maximum term of 3 months.
Company management confirmed that interest-free offers are universal in the sense that they are made to all customers regardless of their credit score, installment balance, or other customer-specific characteristics. The only way customers may have differential access to free installment offers is due their shopping patterns (since free installments are offered with different probabilities at different merchants and vary by time of year) and the possibility that installment-prone customers might actively seek out free installment offers. Free installments are sometimes made available to all of the company's customers regardless of where they shop, but for limited periods of time. These opportunities are announced on the company's web site, or in flyers or ads that are included in the monthly statements that it mails to its customers. Management also confirmed that the maximum term of the offer is independent of the characteristics of the customers, or other variables such as merchant type, or time of year.
Installment term is chosen at purchase time, at the checkout counter via a pin pad, or by notifying the checkout clerk. Customers are informed of the installment interest rate schedule on their monthly statements and via their account on the company's web site. When customers receive interest-free installment offers, the maximum term is part of the offer, and is not a variable that the customer can choose (unlike the case of positive interest rate installments), except that customers are allowed to precommit to pay off the installment in fewer than the maximum number of payments allowed under the offer. If a customer wishes to borrow for a longer term than the one offered, it must be done at a positive interest rate according to the customer-specific interest schedule described above. we would expect consumers to put mainly their larger expenditures on installment and the remaining smaller charges as regular, non-installment credit card charges.
However the surprising result is that installments done at a positive rate of interest are substantially larger than installments done at a zero interest rate, at every quantile of the respective distributions. For example, the median installment at positive interest rates is nearly 60% larger than the median installment done at a zero interest rate. Thus we can see what we have called the free installment puzzle in figure 2:
the average size of a positive interest rate installment is more than 75% larger than the average installment done under a zero interest rate. Economic intuition (e.g. the hypothesis of a downward sloping demand for installment credit) would suggest that installments done at a lower interest rate -and particularly those done at a zero interest rate -should be significantly larger than those done at a positive interest rate.
The right panel of Figure 2 plots the distribution of internal rates of return that the credit card company earned on its installment loans in the post-crisis sample. These returns are inclusive of the merchant fee. Due to space limitations, we do not plot the distribution of internal rates of returns that exclude the merchant fee. This distribution is effectively the distribution of interest rates charged to the company's customers. It is a pronounced bi-modal distribution reflecting the fact that roughly 50% of installment purchases are done at a zero percent interest rate and the other half of positive interest installments are done at a mean interest rate of 15.25%.
The merchant fee shifts the distribution of returns significantly to the right. Even with the interest-free installment transactions included, the company earned an average rate of return of 23% on its installment loans. Note that even the most frequent transaction, ordinary sales, earn a 24% average rate of return for the company when we factor in the merchant fee, which averages 2.3% for this company. For the positive interest installment loans the average internal return inclusive of the merchant fee is even higher, 31.4%. 2 Overall, we conclude that at least for this company, installment loans are excellent investments that offer very high rates of return. Further, in this post-crisis sample, the customers had relatively low risk of default.
These high rates of return explain why credit card companies are so interested in a variety of promotional devices, including use of free installment offers. By increasing the number of customers, spending per customer, and extending its network of merchants, the company's market power is significantly enhanced and this can enable it to raise its merchant fee, which is a significant component of its revenues and profits. If the company were able to raise its average merchant fee from 2.3% to 4%, the rate of return it earns on ordinary sales transactions nearly doubles, to 42% (assuming the same average delay between purchase and repayment on non-installment purchases).
Characteristics of Installment-Prone Customers
We constructed longitudinal balance histories for the customers in our sample to calculate returns and profitability on a customer by customer basis. The primary cost of a customer is the company's cost of credit, i.e. the credit card company's borrowing cost or opportunity cost of capital. In the case of customers who default, the company also loses the uncollected balance of their loan. Revenues include annual fees, late fees, interest and service charges, and merchant fees. We measure gross profits, i.e. we do not know the cost of things such as 1) rewards programs, 2) advertising costs, and 3) other fixed operating costs such as billing and collection costs and wages and salaries and payments to other credit card companies for out of network transactions. Our analysis reveals a substantial degree of heterogeneity across credit card customers in their profitability and their propensity to use of installment loans, and we find that the best single measure of this propensity is the mean share of credit card purchases paid for by installment, something we refer to as the installment share. We now document that installment-prone customers, i.e. those who pay for most of their credit card spending on installment, are both more profitable but also more risky as reflected by worse credit scores. In turn, customers who have worse credit scores also have higher default rates.
The left hand panel of figure 3 presents a scatterplot (with the conditional mean of the data indicated by a local linear regression fit to the data) that shows how the installment share relates to creditworthiness as reflected by the company's internal (proprietary) credit scoring system where a score of 1 represents the best possible creditworthiness and 12 is the worst. Customers who have credit scores in this range are still allowed to borrow on installment up to their credit limit (which we do not observe in either sample).
However consumers who are in the process of collection will have their credit card borrowing and spending privileges suspended and they show up in our data set as having a credit score of 0. We see that customers who rely more on installment spending tend to have worse credit scores. forcing them to make heavier use of installment credit at relatively high rates. In contrast, customers with the best credit scores are the least likely to use installment credit, which may indicate that they are not liquidity constrained such as having access to lower cost sources of credit elsewhere. 3 3 We also find that the incidence of late payments and seriously late payments (i.e. payments that are 90 or more days past due, As we noted previously, there is a clear direction of causality in terms of the positive correlation between the installment share and the credit score: high installment use per se does not degrade the credit score, rather individuals with poor credit scores have the highest demand for installment credit.
In a separate scatterplot (also not shown due to space limitations) we find that the installment share is also strongly positively correlated with the fraction of installment transactions done at zero interest rates.
This suggests that customers who pay for most of their credit card purchases on installment are relatively desperate for credit, which explains why they are significantly more likely to take free installment offers.
For the heaviest installment users in our post-crisis sample, nearly 20% of their installment transactions are interest-free installments. If we assume that the heaviest installment users have a take-up rate for free installments close to 100%, the fact that 20% of all installment transactions for these individuals are free installments provides an estimate of the probability that free installments are offered to customers, an estimate that squares with the one provided by company executives for the post-crisis sample.
The right hand panel of figure 3 relates customer-level profitability (as measured by the overall customerspecific "rate of return", i.e. the calculated internal rate of return the company earns on all transactions for each customer) to the installment share. We see that the most installment prone customers are also the most profitable, and this is due largely to the higher rate of interest the company earns on these customers due to their poorer credit scores. We have already suggested that the company's use of free installment offers seems motivated by a desire to increase its customers' use of its credit cards. However we have also shown that the customers who are most likely to take the free installment offers are more likely to have worse credit scores and make late payments. As such, the use of free installments as a promotional device has the perverse effect of offering free credit to the company's least creditworthy customers, a group most likely to default. Thus, the strategy of offering interest-free installment loans may increase its expected returns, but a the risk of increased rates of default.
Changes in credit card spending and balances before and after the crisis
We aggregated the individual balance histories in our samples to reveal overall changes in spending and balances before and after the 2003 crisis. Figure 4 plots the average total credit card balances (i.e. the sum of the balance currently due plus the installment balance) for the pre and post-crisis samples and or at about the threshold where the company suspends credit card charging privileges) and defaults are also positively correlated with the installment share, confirming that customers who are the heaviest installment spenders tend to be the worst credit risks. The biggest contributor to the decline in balances was the drop in non-installment (currently due) balances, from $1400 in the pre-crisis sample to $700 in the post-crisis sample. Average installment balances also fell by half, from $600 before the crisis to $300 afterwards. The right hand panel of figure 4 shows that the share of customers who carried installment balances declined by a third, from 60% before the crisis to under 40% afterwards. However for the subset of customers who carried positive installment balances, the ratio of installment to credit card balances increased after the crisis: from an average ratio of 1 before the crisis to 1.5 afterwards. This increase was not caused by increased installment spending, rather customers were quick to reduce their balances in their credit card accounts but reduced installment balances more slowly. This is why credit card balances of installment users fell by half but their installment balances fell by a third. Some of the reductions in credit card spending were due to reductions in credit limits. Some of these were imposed by the company in response to deteriorating credit scores of certain customers, but significant number of reductions were done voluntarily at the request of the customer. The company honored significant numbers of voluntary requests by its customers to reduce their credit limits without providing any compensation or reward for doing this. This is precisely the sort of "suboptimal precommitment" behavior that is difficult to explain using standard expected utility models. In the next section we provide evidence of other puzzling precommitments by customers: turning down free installment offers, and precommiting to pay them off faster than necessary.
Exploiting the Quasi-Random Nature of Free Installment Offers
We now present a simple, flexible behavioral model of customers' choice of installment loans that allows us to exploit the quasi-random nature of free installment offers. Our original motivation was to use free installments as an instrumental variable to help identify the effect of interest rates on consumer demand for credit. When we regress the size of installment loans on the interest rate the company charges its customers, we obtain an upward sloping estimated demand curve. Of course, the positive slope is spurious, due to the endogeneity of the interest rate: customers with high demand for installment credit also tend to have worse credit scores and therefore are charged higher interest rates. Several obvious choices of instrumental variables such as the aggregate daily CD or call rates (which affect the banks' opportunity cost of credit and thus serve as exogenous shifters of the interest rates they charge to their customers) turned out to be weak instruments due to the huge, highly variable markups that swamp the small variations in the CD or Call rates. As a result, instrumental variables approaches fail to provide reliable estimates of credit demand. We reasoned that the occasional and often unpredictable interest-free installment offers that this company makes to its customers could function as a quasi-random experiment (QRE) since these offers are made to everyone equally regardless of their characteristics or credit scores. We will now show how it is possible to identify the demand for credit by exploiting the quasi-random nature of free installment offers.
The main econometric problem we face is censoring: the company's data systems only record free installment offers when customers actually choose them. For all other transactions, we do not know whether the customer was offered a free installment opportunity and chose not to take it. Since we are willing to make some reasonable assumptions and put some additional structure on the credit choice problem, we can provide econometric solutions to the censoring problem. The model we present next enables us to infer the probability customers are offered free installments, and to predict how these offers affect their choices.
A Flexible Behavioral Model of Installment Loan Choice
We hypothesize that customers with characteristics x makes a simple cost/benefit calculation about whether to pay for a given transaction in full (d = 1) or choose to pay for the transaction amount a on installment (d ∈ {2, . . . , 12}). We assume that customers choose the payment alternative d that offers the highest net value of benefit less cost, where the cost includes the interest cost of the installment credit (except for d = 1 or interest-free loan offers where this cost is zero), less the cash equivalent value of any additional psychic transactions cost involved in choosing a payment option d besides the "default option" d = 1.
A customer of type x faces an interest rate r(x, d) for an installment loan involving d equal payments.
By default, r(x, 1) = 0, i.e. all customers get an "interest-free loan" if they choose to pay the transaction amount a in full on the next statement date. We normalize the value of this "pay in full" option, d = 1, to 0. However for the installment purchase options d = 2, 3, . . . , 12 we assume that the net value has the form v (a, x, r, d) 
where c (a, r, d ) is the cost of credit equal to the (undiscounted) interest that the customer pays for an installment loan of amount a over duration d at the interest rate r and ov (a, x, d ) is the option value to a customer with characteristics x of paying for the purchase amount a over d months rather than paying the amount in full a the next statement date (which has an option value normalized to 0 as indicated above, ov(a, x, 1) = 0). The option value is net of any transactions costs of choosing one of the non-default options d ∈ {2, . . . , 12} and specific functional forms for these functions will be discussed in more detail shortly.
Thus v (a, x, r, d ) reflects a simple cost/benefit calculation that the customer makes for all of the installment alternatives d ∈ {2, . . . , 12} each time he/she makes a transaction with their credit card, and he/she chooses the alternative d with the highest value v (a, x, r, d) .
We also allow for transitory unobserved factors that affect consumers' decisions about installment term by incorporating additive random shocks ε(d) so that the net utility of installment choice d is We assume that the "error terms" ε = (ε(1), . . . , ε(12)) are IID Generalized extreme value (GEV) random vectors. The GEV family allows for correlation in the random variables ε(d) (see McFadden [1981] )
that reflect "similarity" in unobserved factors affecting consumer choices that violates the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property that holds when the error terms are independently distributed, which is the case for the multinomial logit model. We estimate a version of the GEV distribution that results in a nested logit model of customer installment choices.
Specifically, if the option value function is nonnegative and monotonically increasing in the loan duration d for each (a, x), then in the absence of a random error term, this simple cost-benefit model predicts that consumers should always choose the maximum duration δ ∈ {2, . . . , 12} allowed in any interest-free installment loan offer. However when there are random, unobservable factors affecting consumers' utilities of different installment choices, there is a possibility that the model could predict that a dominated alternative d < δ could be chosen by a customer because the realized value of ε(d) is sufficiently greater a, x, r, d) . Under the GEV specification for ε, we can allow for correlation in ε(d) for d in the set of interest-free alternatives {1, . . . , δ}, and in the limiting case of perfect correlation in these random components, the model predicts that the probability of choosing any of the "dominated" interest-free alternatives d ∈ {1, . . . , δ − 1} is zero.
We are able to estimate the scale parameters σ and σ 1 of the GEV distribution. The parameter σ indexes the level of similarity in the positive interest choices, whereas σ 1 indexes the level of similarity in the interest-free choices in the cases where the customer is offered an interest-free installment offer. We find that the maximum likelihood estimates of σ and σ 1 are very small, so that the predictions of this model are driven by the properties of the v (a, x, r, d) function rather than by the distribution of the unobserved components ε(d).
Let P + (d|x, a) be the choice probability for a customer with characteristics x who does not have an interest-free installment offer. This customer must pay a positive interest rate for any choice d ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 12}. In our notation for the choice probability we omit the interest rate r since as we show below, the interest rate charged to a consumer with characteristics x for an installment loan with term d
) into the value function we see that the net utility of choosing a term of d
, and when we integrate out over the distribution of ε we obtain a conditional choice probability P + (d|x, a) that is a function of (x, a) only.
Now consider a consumer who is offered a free installment opportunity to spread a purchase a over a maximum of δ > 1 payments. We let P 0 (d|x, a, δ) denote the conditional choice probability for the installment term in this situation. This case is similar to the choice problem for a consumer who does not have any free-interest installment offer, except that c(a, r, d) = 0 for d ∈ {1, . . . , δ} in this case, whereas c(a, r, d) = 0 only for d = 1 in the absence of a free installment offer. Presumably, the presence of the free installment option δ should have a major impact on a consumer's choice of installment alternative, and this is reflected by the presence of the maximum term of the free installment offer δ as an additional argument in the conditional choice probability P 0 (d|x, a, δ).
In an online version of this paper we derive the formulas for P + and P 0 implied by the nested logit specification for the errors terms, {ε(d)|d ∈ {1, . . . , 12}}, as well as the likelihood for the data. The likelihood accounts for the censoring of the free installment offers: i.e. it accounts for the fact that we only observe a free installment offer in the case where a customer takes it, but not in cases where the customer does not take the offer. The likelihood depends on two additional objects that we estimate in addition to the 20 customer value functions v (a, x, r, d) : the probability that a customer receives a free installment offer, Π(z), and a probability distribution f (δ), δ ∈ {2, . . . , 12} for the maximum allowed term of this free installment offer. We use the variable z to denote variables that shift the probability of receiving a free installment offer. There are two types of variables entering z: 1) time dummies, and 2) merchant dummies. These are included to reflect the fact that free installments vary considerably over different types of merchants and at different times of the year.
The likelihood has the structure of a mixture model since the probability of observing a particular choice such as d = 1 is a mixture over different ways this choice could have been made. For example the person could have been offered a free installment with maximum term δ = 10 but chose d = 1 instead.
Or the customer may not have received a free installment offer and still chose d = 1. The probability of observing d = 1 is thus a weighted sum of the choice probabilities P 0 (1|a, x) and P + (1|a, x, δ) weighted by the probability that the customer receives a free installment offer Π(z) as well as by the probabilities f (δ)
for the different possible maximum terms of a free installment offer, δ ∈ {2, . . . , 12}.
It is important to note that our specification assumes that the probability of being offered a free installment, Π(z), and the distribution of the maximum term f (δ), do not depend on x, the characteristics of the customer. The company verified that this is the case, and it is due to the nature of the information technology for credit cards: there is no two way dialog between the pin pad at the checkout counter and the company's customer database that enables the company or a merchant to condition a free installment offer on the characteristics x of a particular customer. Thus, we have a credible exclusion restriction that enables us to separately identify the value function v (a, x, r, d ) (which determines the probabilities P 0 and
Testing the Dominance Assumption for Free Installment Offers
Our empirical analysis will focus on testing a key dominance assumption implied by expected utility theory: namely all customers should strictly prefer a free installment opportunity of duration δ over any positive interest rate installment of shorter duration, d = 2, 3, . . . , δ−1. The dominance assumption implies that the probability of choosing any positive interest rate alternative d < δ is zero.
Strong Dominance Assumption
Weak Dominance Assumption
The weak dominance assumption allows the possibility that the consumer may choose to pay for the transaction amount a in full at the next billing cycle, d = 1, rather than take the free installment offer. This behavior is not completely consistent with expected utility theory, but may be consistent with a behavioral theory of habit formation in which consumers are used to taking the default action d = 1. Consumers may perceive a "transactions cost" associated with taking one of the other free installment alternatives, d ∈ {2, . . . , δ}, and this could explain why consumers frequently choose d = 1 over any of the options d ∈ {2, . . . , δ}. Thus, we single out the default choice d = 1 as constituting a special case. Even though it is technically a "dominated alternative" when a free installment offer is present, a variety of theories including habit formation or several of the theories of choice in the presence of self-control problems may explain why the strong dominance assumption would be violated while weak dominance still holds.
Notice that neither the weak or strong dominance assumptions rule out the possibility that consumers might choose a positive interest loan duration d ∈ {δ + 1, . . . , 12}. It may happen that a consumer has a need for credit for a term longer than the maximum term δ allowed under the offer, and every customer has this option by paying a positive interest rate for terms d > δ.
In the remainder of this section we will focus our attention on estimation of an unrestricted model of consumer choice, that does not impose either the weak or strong dominance assumptions. In the unrestricted model, consumers always have the full choice set {1, 2, . . . , 12} and can choose to take a free installment loan offer for a shorter duration than the maximum term allowed under the offer. In the unrestricted model, it will generally be the case that P 0 (d|x, a, δ) > 0, even when d is in the set of "dominated alternatives" {2, 3, . . . , δ − 1}. The weak and strong dominance restrictions emerge as limiting cases of the unrestricted model when the scaling parameter σ 1 for the extreme value unobservables affecting consumer choice of installments takes the value σ 1 = 0, where σ 1 is the similarity parameter for the "lower level nest" of interest-free alternatives. We estimated two different specifications of the GEV model, one where the lower level nest is the full set {1, 2, . . . , δ} and the other where the lower level nest is the set {2, . . . , δ} that excludes alternative d = 1. Strong and weak dominance hold in these respective nestings when σ 1 = 0.
We estimate the unrestricted GEV model (where σ and σ 1 are free parameters both estimated by maximum likelihood), and we strongly reject the hypothesis that σ 1 = 0 for either nesting. Thus the data strongly reject both the weak and strong dominance assumptions.
22

Model Specification
We estimated flexible functional forms for the value function v (a, x, r, d) (a, x, d) represents the value to a consumer with observed characteristics x of the option to borrow an amount a for d periods (billing periods, roughly equal to months). We assumed that the option value is a linear function of the amount borrowed, but there may be "transaction costs" involved in choosing non-default alternatives d > 1. Thus, we estimated the following specification for ov (a, x, d) ov (a, x, d Notice that we assume the option value of having the benefit of extended payment does not depend on the interest rate the credit card company charges the customer, and the customer-specific interest rate schedule r t (d, x) only enters via the cost function c(a, r, d) which is a known function that does not have to be estimated. Combined with the location normalization that v(a, x, r, 1) = 0, this simple cost-benefit specification for v (a, x, r, d ) is an important identifying assumption because it fixes both the location and scale of the value functions and thereby enables us to identify both scale parameters (σ, σ 1 ) of the GEV distribution. Typically neither the location or scale parameters of the unobserved components ε(d) of the value or utility functions are identified, so they are arbitrarily normalized. However McFadden [1981] showed that the value of σ 1 can be identified relative to any normalization for σ.
We assume that the financial cost that a customer perceives due to purchasing an item under installment equals the excess of the total payments that the customer makes over the term of the agreement less the current cost a of the item. That is, we assume c equals the difference between the total payments the customer makes under the installment agreement cumulated with interest to the time the installment agreement ends less the amount the customer purchased, a, discounted back to the date t when the customer purchased the item. This value can be shown to be
where t d is the elapsed time (in days) between the next statement date after the item was purchased and the statement date when the final installment payment is due. The interest rate r is the internal rate of return on the installment loan, and is given by r = r t (d, x) . Obviously, for an interest-free installment opportunity, The parameters of the model are θ = (σ, σ 1 , φ, α, β) where α is a vector of parameters determining the probability of receiving a free installment offer, Π(z, α), and β is a vector of parameters characterizing the probability distribution for the maximum term of a free installment offer, f (δ, β), δ ∈ {2, . . . , 12}. We present the β parameters below (since there are only 10 of them required to estimate the 11 probabilities f (δ, β) for δ ∈ {2, . . . , 12}), but due to space constraints we omit the maximum likelihood estimates of the α parameters (α is a 26 × 1 vector of coefficients for a set of time and merchant class dummies).
We specified ov(a, x, d) = aρ(x, d) where
where
exp{φ j−2 }I{d ≥ j} + φ 11 ib + φ 12 installshare +φ 13 creditscore + φ 14 nlate + φ 15 I{r = 0}.
The fixed transaction cost of choosing an installment term at the checkout counter, λ(x, d), is specified as
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The variable creditscore is the interpolated credit score for the customer at the date of the transactions (the company only periodically updates its credit scores so we only observed them at monthly intervals), and nlate is the number of late payments that the customer had on his/her record at the time the transaction was undertaken, and ib is the customer's installment balance at the time of the transaction. Note that due to the large variability in spending on credit cards by different customers, we normalized both a and ib as ratios of each customer's average statement amount. Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of (σ, σ 1 , φ, β) for the unrestricted GEV specifications for the pre and post-crisis data sets, respectively. 4 The nesting that results in the highest likelihood is the one where the lower level nest consists of the interest-free alternatives {1, . . . , δ} when an interest-free installment offer is present. The maximum likelihood parameter estimates for this nesting are presented in table 3. The parameters σ and σ 1 are precisely estimated and a Wald test decisively rejects the restriction σ 1 = 0. Similarly, for the alternative nesting where the lower level nest is the set {2, . . . , 12} (not shown due to limited space), σ 1 is also very precisely estimated and a Wald test also decisively rejects the hypothesis σ 1 = 0 so we decisively reject the Weak Dominance Assumption as well. 5 While we can easily reject the restriction σ 1 = 0, we do find that our estimated σ 1 is significantly smaller than σ which indicates that individuals find the interest-free alternatives d ∈ {2, . . . , δ} to be significantly more "similar" to each other in terms of unobserved factors ε(d) than for the default choice d = 1 or for any of the positive interest alternatives d ∈ {δ + 1, . . . , 12}.
Estimation Results
In addition to the decisive rejection of the weak and strong dominance assumptions, the model predicts a surprisingly low takeup of free installment offers, both before and after the 2003 crisis. Figure 6 plots the average rate at which free installments were offered before and after the crisis (i.e. the average of the estimated Π(z, α) probabilities, where this probability differs across merchants and time periods), and the implied take up rate of these offers, i.e. the average probability ∑ δ d=2 P 0 (d|x, a, δ) which is the probability that a customer of type x takes the offer, although possibly not for the maximum allowed term δ.
In the pre-crisis sample the average probability of receiving a free installment offer was over 50%, rising rapidly and eaking at nearly 80% by mid 2003 as the credit crisis reached fever pitch. In the post-crisis period, the probability of receiving free installment offers fell dramatically. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis in January 2004, interest-free installments were offered in only 10% of all transactions, though offers slowly increased to about 20% by 2007. Note that these estimates are within the range of probabilities that the company executives told us would be their best guess of likely values in effect after the 2003 crisis. Company executives also confirmed that prior to the crisis the company had been very aggressive in its use of free installment offers, and additionally, merchants were much more likely to partner with the company to sponsor interest-free installments as part of sales promotions. Thus, our findings square with independent evidence provided by company executives.
The right hand panel of figure 6 plots the average probabilities that customers took these free installment offers before and after the 2003 crisis. We see that the estimated takeup rates are quite low, averaging about only 13% in the pre-crisis sample, and about 20% in the post-crisis sample. Note that the average probabilities that free-installments are offered and taken are inferred from our econometric model. However the product of these two probabilities equals the fraction of installment transactions that are done at a zero interest rate and this is something we observe directly in our data. Our model accurately predicts that the incidence of interest-free installments increased from about 6% in ov(a, x, d) and c(a, r, d) is proportional to the difference ρ(x, d) − r(x, d) , and we see that while ρ(x, d) did "tilt" to provide higher option values for longer duration loans in the post-crisis sample, it is still the case that the highest difference between ρ(x, d) and the interest rate r(x, d) occurs at shorter terms such as d = 3. Thus in the absence of any stochastic shocks (and assuming that λ is not too high to make the choice of an installment worthwhile to the customer), the utility maximizing choice of installment term is d = 3 which is also the most popular loan term as we noted above.
However d = 3 is also the most frequently chosen term when customers are offered free installments.
How does the model explain this? When r = 0 the monotonicity of the option value function in d suggests that customers should always be choosing the maximum term offered to them, δ. The left hand panel of figure 8 shows that prior to the 2003 crisis, the company was much more likely to offer its customers free installment offers of longer maximum duration δ than after the crisis. We see that there was nearly equal probability of receiving a free installment offer with maximum term δ in the set {3, 7, 10, 12} whereas after the crisis two thirds of all free installment offers had a maximum term of only δ = 3 months. The right hand panel of figure 8 shows that the transaction cost associated with choosing installment terms d ∈ {2, . . . , 12} decreased in the post-crisis sample. Thus, we conclude that while the company offered its customers many more opportunities to take longer term free installment offers prior to the 2003 crisis, customers chose to forgo most of these offers, and the model captures this effect via higher psychic transactions costs, i.e. a higher λ(x, d). The higher transactions costs increase the probability of choosing d = 1 or d = 3 even in the presence of a free installment offer with a maximum term δ > 3.
After the crisis, customers had less aversion to choosing installments, as reflected in the downward shift in the estimated transactions cost function λ(x, d), but by then the company was no longer offering as many term free installment offers. Most of these offers involved a maximum term of δ = 3 and customers were more likely to take them when offered than the customers in the pre-crisis sample. Thus, the model not only predicts a low takeup rate for interest-free installments, it predicts that takeup increased after the crisis, and it predicts that among those customers who do take interest-free offers, there is a very high probability that the customers will precommit to a term that is less than the maximum term δ allowed under month free installment offer chose the loan for the full 12 installment maximum term. The most frequently chosen option was to precommit to pay off the loan in just 3 installments. This option was chosen by 38% in our simulation of customers who accepted these interest-free installment offers with a maximum allowed term of δ = 12 installments. In the pre-crisis sample, only 2.6% of simulated customers who were offered an interest-free loan for 12 months chose to take this offer for the full 12 month maximum term. The most popular term was also d = 3 and this was chosen by 50% of the individuals who took these offers.
The estimated model also predicts that a small fraction of customers choose installment durations d > δ, i.e. they choose to pay a positive interest rate to borrow for a term longer than the maximum term δ allowed under the free installment offer. For example simulations of the model for the pre-crisis sample show that for the set of customers offered a δ = 3 month free installment offer, 9% take the offer for the full term, i.e. d = δ = 3, 1% choose d = 2, and 1% choose a term d > 3 and pay a positive interest rate.
The remaining 88% choose d = 1, paying the purchase amount in full at the next statement date.
Overall, we conclude that the most dramatic shift in behavior after the 2003 Korean credit crisis was by the company rather than its customers. The company made interest-free installment offers to its customers at very high rates (approaching 80%) prior to the 2003 crisis, but dramatically reduced the rate at which it offered them to just 10% after the crisis. The company also significantly shortened the maximum allowed terms of most of its free installment offers after the crisis. So in effect, there was a significant tightening in the supply of credit provided by the company after the 2003 crisis. Coupled with the significant increase in interest rates that we documented in section 2, we conclude that that it was the credit card company that showed more evidence of self-control problems in the "binge and purge" cycle it followed during the boom and bust of the 2003 Korean credit crisis. The significant drop in the number and value of installment transactions can be explained by the combination of a significant rise in installment interest rates, a large drop in the number of free installment offers, and shorter maximum terms for the offers that were made.
While the behavior of customers did shift after the crisis, most of this shift appears to be caused by the tightening of credit by the company after the crisis. Indeed, in comparison to the dramatic shift in credit policy by the company, its customers appear quite restrained in their behavior, particularly in their reticence to take free installment offers. The higher takeup rate of these offers in the post-crisis sample seems understandable in view of the overall tightening of credit and the significant increases in interest rates in the post-crisis sample. Since interest-free installment offers suddenly became much rarer than before the crisis, it makes sense that customers were on average more likely to take them.
Our finding that the presence of a free installment offer increases the customer's option value for credit (at least in the post-crisis sample) is hard to rationalize using traditional expected utility models, which predict that a consumer's option value of credit should be independent of the cost of credit. In order to fit the data, our estimated model has to allow customers' option values to depend on the cost of credit, so that interest-free offers are regarded as more valuable than the already present option to borrow at a positive interest rate. Of course the model already factors the cost of credit into customers' calculations by deducting the actual cost of credit given by the c (a, r, d ) function. However model fit is significantly improved when we allow the option value function ov (a, x, d ) to depend on r, and particularly to be significantly higher when a free installment option is present. A possible explanation for this finding is that customers realize that free installment opportunities are "fleeting chances" that may not come again for a while. In the pre-crisis sample free installments were common, offered in nearly 60% of all transactions, and in this sample there is no statistically significant effect of free installment offers on the option value of credit. However in the post-crisis sample, the probability of receiving free installment offers had declined precipitously and it is in that sample where we find that presence of a free installment offer significantly increases the customer's perception of the option value of credit.
Finally, we note how the model is able to explain the counterintuitive finding that the distribution of transaction sizes of positive interest installment transactions stochastically dominates the distribution of interest-free transaction amounts that we discussed in section 2. If the "demand for credit" is downward sloping, one would expect that customers would purchase more when r = 0 than when r > 0. The way the figure 9 where we plot the "cut-off" value of spending a (x, d) for which the net benefit of borrowing on installment equals the fixed cost of undertaking it, i.e.
This figure was calculated for an individual in the post-crisis sample with a creditscore=5 (i.e. about average credit) with installshare=.1 and ib = 0 and nlate=4. We see that for positive interest loans, the breakeven ratio (i.e. the amount is expressed as a ratio of the average credit card statement balance) is generally over 5 and is as high as 12 or 13 for the less popular (and more expensive) installment loan durations, d = 8 and d = 11.
The model predicts that fixed costs of taking an interest-free installment loan are lower than the costs of taking a positive interest installment and this reduces the numerator of (10). Even though the effect of free installments on the cutoff level a(x, d) is ambiguous in general, we see from figure 9 that for the particular customer that we plotted, the net effect is to uniformly lower the threshold at which the customer decides to undertake the installment transaction. The effect is particularly pronounced for loans of duration d = 8 and higher: under a free installment offer the cutoff point is less than 5 and as low as 3 times their average statement amount, whereas the cutoffs are over 10 for positive interest installment loans.
This is how the model explains the fact (see figure 2 in section 3) that the distribution of free installment transaction sizes is stochastically dominated by the distribution of positive interest transaction sizes. The model is telling us that the "acceptance threshold" a(x, d) for undertaking an installment transaction is lower for free installment offers than for installments done at positive interest rates. The gap between these thresholds is particularly pronounced at higher loan durations. Thus, the model predicts that customers are more likely to choose an installment (d > 1) for smaller size transaction if the installment is interestfree than when it is at a positive interest rate. This implies that the distribution of transaction amounts for positive interest installments stochastically dominates the distribution of transaction amounts for free installments that we observed in figure 2.
Capturing Heterogeneity in Installment Choices
Quantitatively, the most important x variable in the model is installshare, the share of creditcard spending that the customer does under installment. We included installshare because it serves as an important observable indicator of unobserved preference heterogeneity, as well as an observed indicator about which consumers are most likely to be liquidity constrained. We found that neither creditscore nor the number of late payments nlate are as powerful as the installshare variable in enabling the model to fit the data and capture the high degree of customer-specific heterogeneity that we found in our analysis in section 2.
The large negative and strongly statistically significant estimated coefficients of the installshare variable In fact, it turns out that installshare is the most important single factor affecting differential take-up of free installment offers across customers in our sample. Thus, we found the installshare variable to be a convenient, low-dimensional means of capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the behavior of the consumers in our sample. An alternative estimation strategy would be to replace installshare by a random parameter τ representing unobserved heterogeneity with the interpretation that lower values of τ indicate customers who are more desperate for liquidity and thus have a higher subjective willingness to pay for loans of various durations, ρ (x, d, τ, φ) . For example, we tried to capture unobserved heterogeneity using the approach of Heckman and Singer [1984] but found it computationally infeasible to estimate the model. 6 We had much more success in capturing customer-specific heterogeneity using a fixed effects approach.
Since we have (unbalanced) panel data, we have a subset of customers for whom we observe sufficiently many transactions to be able to estimate subsets of the φ parameters on a customer by customer basis. For example, in the longer post-crisis sample we observe more than 100 credit card transactions for 470 of the 611 customers in our estimation sample and the maximum number of observations for any single customer was 1981. Though it is possible to estimate all 29 of the φ parameters on a customer by customer basis for the subset of 470 customers for whom we have more than 100 transaction observations, we found it easier to estimate customer-specific constant terms in the h(x, d, φ) and λ(x, d, φ) functions given in equations (8) and (9) above. Specifically, for the subsample of the 470 customers for whom we have at least 100 observations per customer, we estimated customer-specific constantsφ i,12 andφ i,16 , where i indexes this subset of 470 customers, i = 1, . . . , 470, so in effect we estimated a total of 27 φ parameters that were common to all individuals, plus an additional 940 = 2 * 470 customer-specific intercept terms in the h and λ functions. 7 We found that although there is a substantial amount of customer-specific differences in the estimated (9), and, as we will show below {u i } and {e i } are "residuals" that turned out to have approximate mean zero and are mean-independent of the installshare variable.
Thus, while some readers may worry about the problem of "endogeneity" by including the installshare variable as an explanatory variable into the model of installment choice, it is actually just a parsimonious way of capturing the considerable degree of customer-specific parameter heterogeneity in our estimated many observed transactions -are very small probabilities. We had great difficulty doing the numerical integration in an accurate and reliable manner. When we try to maximize the log-likelihood we ended up having to take logs of probabilities that turned out to be too small to be reliably computed on 64 bit computers. 7 For identification purposes, we normalized φ 0 = 0 and φ 27 = 0 to do these customer-specific fixed-effect estimations, since the sum of the installment loan duration variables equals a constant term and thus, the customer-specific intercepts would not be identified without such additional normalizations. Further, in the cases where a customer does no installment spending, the customer-specific intercepts are not identified, so we were unable to estimate these for the small number of individuals who did no installment spending. model. Even though there is some degradation in the likelihood resulting from usingφ 12 installshare i instead ofφ i,12 , andφ 16 installshare i instead ofφ i,16 , there were major computational savings resulting from having to estimate only 26 φ parameters instead of 965 = 940 + 25 (here we account for the 28 φ parameters less the two identifying normalizations discussed above), and we found that our estimates of the other φ parameters did not change significantly as a result using this more parsimonious specification for capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the model.
Model Identification
Given the high degree of censoring in our data (i.e. the fact that we observe free installments in only 2.7% of all transactions in the post-crisis sample), it may seem surprising that we can separately identify the consumer choice probabilities P + (d|x, a), P 0 (d|a, x, δ) from the probability that customers are offered free installments Π(z, α) and also identify the probability distribution f (δ, β) of the maximum term of free installment offers. How is it that the model can enable us to infer so much about customer behavior in the 97.3% of transactions where we cannot observe whether a free installment was offered or not?
We start by observing that the model is identified. Our model is a fully parametric one and we are also greatly assisted by the a priori exclusion restriction that the probability Π(z, α) that a customer is offered a free installment does not depend on customer characteristics x. As we have noted above, this is a strong piece of identifying information but one that is completely justified by virtue of quasi random nature of the free installment offers. Company management confirmed to us that customers are offered free installments without regard to their characteristics x and we relied on this prior information and imposed this exclusion restriction as a powerful source of identification of our model.
Additional evidence that the model is identified comes from the fact that we can decisively reject both the Weak and Strong Dominance Assumptions. If the model was not well identified, it would be possible to fit the data under these restrictions nearly as well as without them, since these assumptions only restrict customer behavior in situations we do not observe. Yet we are able to decisively reject these assumptions because the model is unable to fit the data as well when the Weak and Strong Dominance Assumptions hold. Why? The reason is that there are two different ways to predict the small fraction of free installment transactions. One way is to predict that very few of these offers are made, but the take up rate is relatively high. The other way is to predict that free installments are made at a higher rate but the take up rate is lower. The data favors the former explanation since the latter explanation results in low option values for installment credit (to explain the low take up rate), but the low option values cause the model to underpredict the number of positive interest installment offers chosen.
However the other explanation that the data prefer, namely to have the model predict high take-up rate but a low probability of being offered a free installment, has its own difficulties fitting all of the data. In this case, the model overestimates the number of free and positive installment offers taken. For example, under the Weak Dominance Assumption, simulations of the model result in 3.3% of all transactions being done as free installments and 4.1% as positive interest installments, whereas in the data the corresponding percentages are 2.7% and 3.7%, respectively.
Though it beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full analysis of the non-parametric identification of the model under the weakest possible conditions, an online version of this paper proves that the model is non-parametrically partially identified. The degree of partial identification is sufficient to enable us to separately infer individual choice probabilities P + and P 0 with no parametric restrictions on the underlying value/utility function v (a, x, r, d) , We can fully identify the probabilities of receiving a free installment offer Π(z) and the distribution f (δ) of the maximum term of these offers.
However we chose to present flexible parametric estimates of these objects because the results are easier to understand and interpret and because we believe our simple model of choice of payment terms does not rely on implausible or highly restrictive a priori assumptions, yet this additional parametric structure allows us to make the more detailed predictions of how consumers react to the presence of free installment offers that we cannot directly observe. In particular, we do not believe that any of our main empirical conclusions are artifacts of functional form assumptions, and are robust to reasonable modifications of the assumed functional forms for the value functions v (a, x, r, d) or the distributions of unobserved components of these values, ε(d), d ∈ {1, . . . , 12}.
Model Fit
We now discuss the fit of the model. Figures 10, summarizes the ability of the structural model to fit the credit card data. Of course the predominant choice by consumers is to pay their credit card purchases in full by the next installment date: this is the choice made in vast majority of the customer/purchase transactions in our data set. When we simulate the estimated model of installment choice, taking the x and purchase amounts a as given for the observations in our data sets, we obtain predicted (simulated) choices of paying in full at the next statement (i.e. to choose d = 1) that closely matches the observed frequency as well as are 9%, 37% and 50%, respectively. Given the standard errors of these percentages, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the simulation estimates equal the sample values at the 5% significance level.
Overall, we feel that the model does an excellent job of capturing the key features that we observe in our credit card data. We also conducted a battery of Chi-squared goodness of fit tests using the random-cell
Chi-squared test of Andrews [1988] . We tried several different choices of partitions and while particular values of the Chi-squared statistics are sensitive to how we choose these partitions, we found that with few exceptions the Chi-squared test was unable to reject the model at conventional levels of significance. At the same time the Chi-square tests generally decisively reject both the specifications where we impose the Weak and Strong Dominance assumptions. This is consistent with our Likelihood ratio tests, which also provided strong rejections of the Weak and Strong Dominance Assumptions. 
Implied Demand for Credit
Though it is not the main focus of this paper, we can use the estimated model of installment choice to calculate the implied conditional demand curve for installment credit (i.e. demand for credit conditional on the decision to purchase amount a using this credit card c). Though a simple regression of the amount of installment borrowing on the interest rate charged results in an upward sloping estimated demand curve -a spurious result due to the endogeneity of the interest rate -the demand curves implied by our estimated discrete choice model are downward sloping, though fairly inelastic. We calculated the demand elasticities for our two illustrative customers -the "installment avoider" and the "installment addict" -at the average installment interest rate, 15%, and found in both cases their demand for credit is quite inelastic. The calculated elasticity for the installment addict is -0.074 whereas the demand elasticity of the installment avoider is -0.11. We find that the demand for installment credit is highly inelastic for virtually all of the individuals in our sample.
The left hand panel of figure 11 plots the distribution of estimated demand elasticities for 607 individuals in the post-crisis sample for whom we had enough data on purchases to calculate reasonable estimates of demand elasticities. We see a very skewed distribution with the lower tail containing a minority of individuals who have relatively elastic demand functions, but the vast majority of individuals have demand elasticities that are quite inelastic and concentrated near 0.
The right hand panel of figure 11 compares the distribution of the maximum terms of free installments that are offered to customers in the pre-crisis sample (blue line) to the distribution of terms of the free installment offers that were chosen (red line). We can now answer the question raised in section 3, 38 namely whether pattern of chosen durations of free installment offers is supply-driven and determined by the company offering few interest-free installments with long payback terms, or whether these durations are demand-driven and a consequence of customer choices. We see that the distribution of offered terms is very different from the distribution of accepted terms. The maximum terms of company's offers were approximately equally distributed over terms of 3, 7, 10 and 12 payments. However the customers overwhelmingly preferred to borrow for shorter terms, with the most popular choices being 3 months (chosen by customers in 72% of all free installment offers that were taken) and 2 months (chosen by customers in 16% of all free installment offers that were taken). This graph illustrates rather starkly the key prediction of our model: customers who took free installment offers overwhelming chose to precommit to pay them off over a terms that was substantially shorter than the maximum term allowed under the offer. The left hand panel of figure 12 shows how the choice probabilities of the "installment avoider" are affected by the transaction size a. This person had virtually no chance of choosing any installment duration greater than d = 3 when facing positive interest rates, however once a 10 month free installment offer is on the table, the customer's chance of taking the 10 month free installment offer starts to increase significantly with the size of the purchase amount a. When a = 0.2 (i.e. a transaction that is 20% of the size of the customer's average monthly balance due), the free installment option has very little effect on this consumer's choice probabilities. However when a = 1.0 the probability of choosing alternatives d = 1 and d = 3 fall significantly relative to the case where a free installment offer is not available, and the probabilities of choosing installment durations d = 6 and d = 10 increase significantly. For sufficiently large purchases such as a = 4.0 the probability of taking the offer for the full 10 months rises to 100%.
The story is similar for the installment addict, except that this person takes advantage of the free installment option at lower purchase amounts than the installment avoider. For a purchase of size a = 0.2, the probability of alternative d = 1 is only 20% when a 10 month free installment offer is present, compared to nearly 70% otherwise. It is interesting to note, however, that the installment addict is less likely to choose the full 10 month duration of the free installment opportunity than the installment avoider. there is less than a 25% chance that this person will actually choose the free installment at the maximum duration offered, d = 10. The solid red line in figure 12 shows the choice probability of an installment addict who purchase an amount that is 20% of his typical statement amount. If this person offered a 10 month free installment offer, the probability the person will choose d = 10 is less than 10%.
This precommitment behavior, along with the fairly low probability that free installment offers are predicted to be chosen, constitutes a significant challenge to expected utility models, which generally predict that rational individuals should choose the maximum allowed term when offered an interest-free loan. In other words, expected utility models predict that individuals should satisfy the Strong Dominance Assumption, which our empirical findings have decisively rejected.
Conclusions
Using two new high frequency micro panel data sets on transactions of two random samples of customers of a major Korean credit card company before and after the 2003 Korean credit crisis, we offer evidence of pervasive precommitment behavior by Korean credit card holders that is difficult to explain using standard models of rational expected utility maximization. Specifically we find three different types of behavior that is difficult to explain using traditional economic theories: 1) customers voluntarily reduce their credit card borrowing limits without any compensation or reward for doing so, 8 2) customers have a high probability of turning down interest-free installment loan offers, and 3) of the small fraction of customers who do accept interest-free loan offers, most precommit to pay off the loan over a shorter term than the maximum allowed term under the offer.
These behaviors can be explained by more recent economic theories of temptation and self-control.
They can be interpreted as acts of financial self control where customers resist temptations to borrow and spend with their credit cards in order to avoid becoming excessively indebted. However there may be other explanations for these behaviors, though it not clear how plausible they are. For example, we discussed stigma, financial illiteracy, and irrational beliefs as alternative explanations for the behavior we find. We have already expressed our doubts about the stigma explanation, and we are also skeptical that these behaviors reflect financial illiteracy, such as failing to understand the benefits of interest-free loan offers. In previous studies of financial literacy, the least financially literate individuals are also the ones most likely to pay the highest interest rates and be bad credit risks. But we have found that in our data, the customers who are the worst credit risks and who pay the highest interest rates are also the ones who are most likely to take advantage of interest-free loan offers. We also have problems with the explanation that customers have irrational fears that borrowing will degrade one's credit score. For example, it seems reasonable that such fears would have increased after the crisis, but this does not square with the higher take-up of interest-free offers after the 2003 credit crisis.
Regardless of the underlying explanation for the behavior, or whether we classify the behavior as "rational" or "irrational", our findings are important for improving our understanding of the causes and consequences of the 2003 credit boom and bust in Korea. We conclude that the customers in our samples exercised a high degree of financial self-control by forgoing most interest-free borrowing opportunities that were offered to them. From our perspective, it is difficult to blame excessive spending and borrowing by these customers as the primary "cause" of the 2003 Korean credit crisis. Instead, to the extent we consider the crisis to be a result of a failure of financial self-control, we would inclined to place more of the blame on the credit card company which "binged" by offering free installment offers to its customers at extremely high rates prior to the 2003 crisis, and then dramatically contracted its supply of credit after the crisis. The company sharply reduced its supply of credit in three different ways: 1) it sharply curtailed the rate at which it offered interest-free loans to its customers (from 80% at the peak of the crisis to 10% just after the crisis), 2) it reduced maximum term of interest-free offers, so that after the crisis most loans had a maximum term of three months, and 3) it significantly increased its interest rates across the board.
Of course, we are not suggesting that this single company deserves to be blamed for the 2003 Korean credit crisis. The question is the extent to which this company and its customers are representative of the Korean market as a whole. Relative to the overall Korean credit card sector, the experience of this particular company was actually rather moderate. The company we study is a major bank that has been a long term player in the credit card market, and thus has considerable experience in credit evaluation.
Though its default rates did peak in 2003, its losses due to defaults were modest. In comparison there were other newer entrants to the credit card market in Korea that expanded too rapidly and made poor credit decisions. As Kang and Ma [2009] observed, nearly one third of all credit card debt outstanding at the peak in 2002 had to be written off and "Through either an understatement of the rules involved or the knowing acceptance of greater risks, the result was excessive lending and riskier credit card lending portfolios. Moreover, in addition to generally easier loan standards, there was a deliberate strategy to target the market for less prime and higher-yielding revolvers. Thus, competition for market share started moving down the credit spectrum. As a consequence, the composition of the cardholder base changed markedly, leading to larger and higher-risk card lending portfolios." p. 60
We noted that network externalities in the credit card market create strong increasing returns to scale and a "winner take all" aspect to competition in the Korean credit card market, since the firm with the dominant market can charge the highest merchant fees and we have shown that these fees constitute a large share of this company's profits. Thus, when financial liberalizations in Korea enabled inexperienced firms to enter the credit card market and quickly gain significant market share by lending to increasingly risky customers, the company we study no doubt felt strong pressure to respond defensively to protect its own market share. This pressure could explain why it made so many free installment offers for longer durations prior to the 2003 crisis. After the crisis there was exit or sharp reductions in the operations of the less experienced new entrants, including a collective takeover of LG Card by a coalition of banks that was engineered by the Korean government. These factors could have dramatically altered the competitive landscape after the crisis, which could explain why the company raised interest rates and significantly reduced the number of free installment offers and reduced their maximum terms.
In conclusion, we believe that a deeper understanding of heterogeneity -both at the firm level and at the customer level -is critical for understanding the dynamics of the Korean credit crisis. No doubt there was excessive lending to customers who were not creditworthy but most of this appears to have been done by the less experienced new entrants. However the reckless behavior of these new entrants forced the more prudent and experienced longer term players in this market, such as the company we studied, to also behave in a more aggressive and less prudent fashion and this is manifested in part by the high rates of free installment offers to its customers that we found in the pre-crisis sample. We showed that there is very significant heterogeneity in the company's customers, and the least creditworthy of these customers are the ones who were the most likely to take the free installment offers the company offered. This small minority of customers with the most elastic demand for credit were responsible for the peak in default rates that the company experienced in 2003.
Our study suggests that the various players in these markets have varying degrees of financial selfcontrol and experience, and highlights how market forces can create strong incentives for herd-like behavior that can cause even the relatively more prudent and self-controlled actors to make unwise decisions. It is possible that crazy behavior by a relatively small fraction of players in the market to lead to a lemminglike stampede that could have fairly serious collective consequences unless the stampede can be dissipated before it gets too large to be controlled and turn into a credit crisis that can have costly macroeconomic consequences. In their analysis of the macro data at a quarterly level Kang and Ma [2009] showed that the credit crisis "clearly caused the private consumption downturn in 2003" which suggests that the significant reduction in credit card balances of the customers in our sample was not just due to a shift in spending from one credit card to another (or spending in cash) but rather due to an overall reduction in consumption spending. Fortunately in the case of Korea, rapid action by the government prevented the crisis from turning into a serious recession unlike what happened in aftermath of the meltdown in the mortgage market in the U.S. in 2008.
